Of N.T. Wright, Pluralisms, And The Art of Conceptual Whistleblowing

Hermeneutical pluralists, as we know, wish to tell us just how hard it is, by which they mean (of course) how impossible it is, to know what this or that text in the Bible "really" means. They would have us know that we are really just reading our own prejudices into the text, and pretty much reaping just what we sow.

The proof for all this literary mayhem? "All those different (conflicting) interpretations out there." Well, here is a helpful little quote I ran across from a New Testament scholar of some note, which he did not intend to be used to make the following point. But it does anyway. What we imply by what we say, or write, is not always what we intend. Implications follow from what is said or written (whether we like them or not).

Keep the hermeneutical pluralists putative justification in mind when you read this, and it might - oh it just might - prove fascinating:

This is from N.T. Wright's book he co-authored with Marcus Borg, called The Meaning of Jesus. At the beginning two chapters, each scholar takes a turn to discuss how we know about Jesus, and how the source materials for knowing about Him are handled. In this context, Wright says (p. 21):

"Mutually incompatible theories abound as to where, when, and why the Synoptic Gospels came to final form. Since there is no agreement about sources, there is no agreement as to how and why the different evangelists used them. If, for instance, we believe that Matthew used Mark, we can discuss Matthew's theology on the basis of his editing of Mark [i.e. Mark's Gospel]. If we don't believe Matthew used Mark, we can't."

Now consider the claim of the interpretive pluralist, and then consider the plight for contemporary (non-canonical) New Testament criticism. Often the pluralist will also advance some view of Jesus as "historical" over against the canonical one. Do you see a problem here?

The platforms from which one might launch his various objections to the objective knowability of the truths of the Christian canon often turnout to be their own worst enemies. This is the problem of the circular firing squad. All you have to do is duck to win.

A few examples? These come from your local college campus.

1. Slavery is wrong.
2. There are no moral absolutes.

One of these might be true, but not both.

A. A woman has a right to control her own body (this is used as a justification for abortion).

B. There are no moral absolutes.

These are not logically compatible either. For proposition A (immediately above) assumes you have the objective moral obligation to acknowledge the rights of other people. Why simply respond to proposition A with "so what," all so-called rights are "just conventions" since there are no moral absolutes (remember?).

i. You just have faith

ii. we have reason on our side.

This notably assumes that no faith is also reasonable. But this is not proven, so it is simply an article of faith. As it turns out, all forms of reasoning have basic beliefs not provable from those basic beliefs themselves (with one very auspicious exception).

For knowledge-theory geeks: This is in short a version of Kurt Godel's "incompleteness" theorem. But Godel's stricture falsely assumes that all knowledge is of the same kind (theoretical), and this does not allow for the possibility of revelation (non-theoretical knowledge).

I. Christians should be more tolerant. [Either that or "Atheists" should be Christians]

II. There are no moral absolutes. [Why then OUGHT Christians to do anything?]

1. All religions are equally valid.
2. Some religions are not tolerant

The above pair would imply -- if we assume that tolerance is good -- that all religions are equally valid, unless they are not the ones I find tolerant. (i.e. some religions are more equal than others).

a. Evolution is true
b. You should not plagiarize papers or cheat on science exams.

The truth of "a" implies that people are merely animals. Animals are not morally responsible to do anything. They just do what they do. Therefore, b is false if a is true. This means your professor -- given a -- has no reason to penalize you for denying "a" on your exam or in your papers.

Now let us return to the pluralistas. Not everyone is a pluralist, hermeneutical or otherwise. Since all sorts of non-pluralistic views exist, why should pluralism be assumed true -- given its insistence that multiple competing theories imply the inability to know theory or interpretation which is true? How can the pluralist know his pluralist interpretation of (unknowable) reality is correct?

Now put the pluralist thesis next to some of our candidates:

1. When mulitple interpretations exist, we cannot know
2. There are no absolutes

But some people believe there are absolutes, generating multiple ethical interpretations of reality. This would mean that the pluralist cannot know the truth of proposition 2.

A. When mulitple interpretations exist, we cannot know
B. Evolution is true

But some people are creationists. This generates the multiple theoretical interpretation problem. Therefore, given A, the pluralist cannot know if evolution(ism) is true.

a. When mulitple interpretations exist, we cannot know
b. Science yields true theories

But every science has multiple competitors (or could) for any one theory. Therefore, given a, we must logically deny the knowability of b.

It turns out that it is always possible to deny the pluralist thesis in any context, historical study (as with the N.T. Wright quote above), the sciences, or in legal studies. This denial generates a competitor for pluralism, sufficient to overcome it in each case, on its own terms.

This pretty much makes the pluralist something of a rhetorical punching bag. Don't blame me for the vulnerability of silly arguments. The truth statuses of propositions already have their boundaries set by God in the light of nature. The logically-necessary propositions (which includes all biblical propositions taken together) form those boundaries. I just deliver the message when folks step across the boundaries -- though not nearly so clearly as N.T. Wright.

Whistle-blowing can take many forms. This is the conceptual kind of whistle-blowing. It has a long and glorious history too, like other forms of rational scrutiny. Only my targets, or perhaps patients, are more modern.